Arbeitspapier
Financial Incentives and the Timing of Retirement: Evidence from Switzerland
We use reforms in the Swiss public retirement system to identify the responsiveness of retirement timing to financial incentives. A permanent reduction of retirement benefits by 3.4 percent induces more than 70 percent of females to postpone their retirement. The responsiveness of male workers, who undergo a different treatment, is lower.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: BGPE Discussion Paper ; No. 9
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Retirement; Retirement Policies
Social Security and Public Pensions
Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-labor Market Discrimination
- Thema
-
retirement insurance
incentives
social security
labor force exit
natural experiment
Switzerland
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hanel, Barbara
Riphahn, Regina
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE)
- (wo)
-
Nürnberg
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hanel, Barbara
- Riphahn, Regina
- Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE)
Entstanden
- 2006
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Financial incentives and the timing of retirement: evidence from Switzerland
Financial incentives and the timing of retirement: evidence from Switzerland
Financial incentives and the timing of retirement : empirical evidence from Switzerland and Germany
New Evidence on Financial Incentives and the Timing of Retirement
Health, Financial Incentives and Retirement in Spain
Inconsistent retirement timing
The Importance of Financial Incentives on Retirement Choices
Macroeconomic Determinants of Retirement Timing
Are Financial Retirement Incentives More Effective if Pension Knowledge is High?
Nonparametric Evidence on the Effects of Financial Incentives on Retirement Decisions
Are financial retirement incentives more effective if pension knowledge is high?
Interactions Between Financial Incentives and Health in the Early Retirement Decision
Financial incentives and the timing of retirement: evidence from Switzerland
Financial incentives and the timing of retirement: evidence from Switzerland
Financial incentives and the timing of retirement : empirical evidence from Switzerland and Germany
New Evidence on Financial Incentives and the Timing of Retirement
Health, Financial Incentives and Retirement in Spain
Inconsistent retirement timing
The Importance of Financial Incentives on Retirement Choices
Macroeconomic Determinants of Retirement Timing
Are Financial Retirement Incentives More Effective if Pension Knowledge is High?
Nonparametric Evidence on the Effects of Financial Incentives on Retirement Decisions
Are financial retirement incentives more effective if pension knowledge is high?
Interactions Between Financial Incentives and Health in the Early Retirement Decision
Financial incentives and the timing of retirement: evidence from Switzerland
Financial incentives and the timing of retirement: evidence from Switzerland
Financial incentives and the timing of retirement : empirical evidence from Switzerland and Germany
New Evidence on Financial Incentives and the Timing of Retirement
Health, Financial Incentives and Retirement in Spain
Inconsistent retirement timing
The Importance of Financial Incentives on Retirement Choices
Macroeconomic Determinants of Retirement Timing
Are Financial Retirement Incentives More Effective if Pension Knowledge is High?
Nonparametric Evidence on the Effects of Financial Incentives on Retirement Decisions
Are financial retirement incentives more effective if pension knowledge is high?