Arbeitspapier
Fiscal federalism and foreign transfers: does inter-jurisdictional competition increase foreign aid effectiveness?
This paper empirically studies the impact of decentralization and inter-jurisdictional competition on foreign aid effectiveness. For this purpose we examine a commonly used empirical growth model, considering different measures of fiscal decentralization. Our panel estimations reveal that expenditure decentralization and inter-jurisdictional competition - reflected by the degree of tax revenue decentralization - negatively impact aid effectiveness. We therefore conclude that donor countries should carefully consider how both anti-poverty instruments - foreign assistance and decentralization - work together.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 10/10
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Foreign Aid
Growth
Interjurisdictional Competition
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Lessmann, Christian
Markwardt, Gunther
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Technische Universität Dresden, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften
- (where)
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Dresden
- (when)
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2010
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Lessmann, Christian
- Markwardt, Gunther
- Technische Universität Dresden, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Time of origin
- 2010