Arbeitspapier

The effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on CEO pay for luck

According to the rent-extraction hypothesis, weak corporate governance allows entrenched CEOs to capture the pay-setting process and benefit from events outside of their controlget paid for luck. In this paper, I find that the independence requirement imposed on boards of directors by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), together with the governance regulations subsequently introduced by stock exchanges, affects CEO pay structure. In firms whose corporate boards were originally less independent, and thus more affected by these provisions, CEO pay for performance strengthened while pay for luck decreased after adopting SOX. In contrast, those firms that exhibited strong board independence prior to SOX showed little evidence of pay for luck and little change in pay for performance following the adoption of SOX. The results are consistent with the rent-extraction hypothesis, and they are robust to alternative explanations such as asymmetric benchmarks, oligopoly, and managerial talent.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bank of Canada Working Paper ; No. 2008-20

Classification
Wirtschaft
Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Subject
Labour markets
Führungskräfte
Vergütungssystem
Leistungsentgelt
Corporate Governance
Internes Kontrollsystem
USA

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Paligorova, Teodora
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bank of Canada
(where)
Ottawa
(when)
2008

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2008-20
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Paligorova, Teodora
  • Bank of Canada

Time of origin

  • 2008

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