Arbeitspapier
Regional Tax Coordination and Foreign Direct Investment
The paper analyzes the effects of a regionally coordinated profit tax in a model with three active countries, one of which is not part of the union, and a globally mobile firm. We show that regional tax coordination can lead to two types of welfare gains. First, for investments that would take place in the region in the absence of coordination, this measure can transfer location rents from the firm to the union. Second, by internalizing all of the union's benefits from foreign direct investment, a coordinated policy attracts more investment than when member states act in isolation. Consequently, tax levels may rise or fall under regional coordination.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 628
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
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tax competition
regional coordination
international investment
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Haufler, Andreas
Wooton, Ian
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
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2001
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Haufler, Andreas
- Wooton, Ian
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2001
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