Arbeitspapier

Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations

This paper looks at how the reputation of a monetary policy making committee is jointly determined with the reputations of its individual members. I ask whether individuals ha ve more or less incentive to gain a reputation for being tough on inflation when they are part of a group. I examine the effect of increased transparency - in the form of publishing the votes of individual members - on individuals' incentives to appear hard nosed. I look at how other institutional features of central banks affect the policy making body's incentive to refrain from inflation.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 226

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Reputation
collective decision making
central banks

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Sibert, Anne
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
1999

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Sibert, Anne
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 1999

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