Arbeitspapier
Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations
This paper looks at how the reputation of a monetary policy making committee is jointly determined with the reputations of its individual members. I ask whether individuals ha ve more or less incentive to gain a reputation for being tough on inflation when they are part of a group. I examine the effect of increased transparency - in the form of publishing the votes of individual members - on individuals' incentives to appear hard nosed. I look at how other institutional features of central banks affect the policy making body's incentive to refrain from inflation.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 226
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
Reputation
collective decision making
central banks
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Sibert, Anne
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
-
1999
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Sibert, Anne
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 1999
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