Arbeitspapier
Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations
This paper looks at how the reputation of a monetary policy making committee is jointly determined with the reputations of its individual members. I ask whether individuals ha ve more or less incentive to gain a reputation for being tough on inflation when they are part of a group. I examine the effect of increased transparency - in the form of publishing the votes of individual members - on individuals' incentives to appear hard nosed. I look at how other institutional features of central banks affect the policy making body's incentive to refrain from inflation.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 226
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Reputation
collective decision making
central banks
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Sibert, Anne
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
1999
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Sibert, Anne
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 1999