Arbeitspapier
Coarse Correlated Equilibria in an Abatement Game
We consider the well-analyzed abatement game (Barrett 1994) and prove that correlation among the players (nations) can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoffs. As these games are potential games, correlated equilibrium - CE - (Aumann 1974, 1987) cannot improve upon Nash; however we prove that coarse correlated equilibria - CCE - (Moulin and Vial 1978) may do so. We compute the largest feasible total utility and hence the efficiency gain in any CCE in those games: it is achieved by a lottery over only two pure strategy profiles.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; No. E2014/24
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
- Subject
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Abatement game
Coarse correlated equilibrium
Efficiency gain
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Moulin, Herve
Ray, Indrajit
Gupta, Sonali Sen
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
- (where)
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Cardiff
- (when)
-
2014
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Moulin, Herve
- Ray, Indrajit
- Gupta, Sonali Sen
- Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
Time of origin
- 2014
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