Arbeitspapier
Coarse Correlated Equilibria in an Abatement Game
We consider the well-analyzed abatement game (Barrett 1994) and prove that correlation among the players (nations) can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoffs. As these games are potential games, correlated equilibrium - CE - (Aumann 1974, 1987) cannot improve upon Nash; however we prove that coarse correlated equilibria - CCE - (Moulin and Vial 1978) may do so. We compute the largest feasible total utility and hence the efficiency gain in any CCE in those games: it is achieved by a lottery over only two pure strategy profiles.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; No. E2014/24
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
- Thema
-
Abatement game
Coarse correlated equilibrium
Efficiency gain
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Moulin, Herve
Ray, Indrajit
Gupta, Sonali Sen
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
- (wo)
-
Cardiff
- (wann)
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2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Moulin, Herve
- Ray, Indrajit
- Gupta, Sonali Sen
- Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
Entstanden
- 2014