Arbeitspapier

Coarse Correlated Equilibria in an Abatement Game

We consider the well-analyzed abatement game (Barrett 1994) and prove that correlation among the players (nations) can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoffs. As these games are potential games, correlated equilibrium - CE - (Aumann 1974, 1987) cannot improve upon Nash; however we prove that coarse correlated equilibria - CCE - (Moulin and Vial 1978) may do so. We compute the largest feasible total utility and hence the efficiency gain in any CCE in those games: it is achieved by a lottery over only two pure strategy profiles.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; No. E2014/24

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
Thema
Abatement game
Coarse correlated equilibrium
Efficiency gain

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Moulin, Herve
Ray, Indrajit
Gupta, Sonali Sen
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
(wo)
Cardiff
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Moulin, Herve
  • Ray, Indrajit
  • Gupta, Sonali Sen
  • Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School

Entstanden

  • 2014

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