Arbeitspapier

A perfectly competitive economy is an economy without welfare relevant endogenous learning

I demonstrate a straightforward but apparently widely unrecognized implication of the standard requirements for perfect competition: an economy in which consumers can choose to learn is generally not perfectly competitive. In particular, if endogenous welfare relevant learning is feasible, the economy cannot be perfectly competitive unless identical learning choices by all consumers are guaranteed. If the new information is not shared with everyone, asymmetric information arise; if information is shared, externalities arise. The standard conditions for the two fundamental welfare theorems, thus, implicitly preclude heterogeneous welfare relevant learning decisions.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Memorandum ; No. 02/2021

Classification
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Perfect Competition
General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: General
Welfare Economics: General
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Externalities
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Subject
Perfect competition
fundamental welfare theorems
learning
symmetric information
externalities

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Nyborg, Karine
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Oslo, Department of Economics
(where)
Oslo
(when)
2021

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Nyborg, Karine
  • University of Oslo, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2021

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