Arbeitspapier
A perfectly competitive economy is an economy without welfare relevant endogenous learning
I demonstrate a straightforward but apparently widely unrecognized implication of the standard requirements for perfect competition: an economy in which consumers can choose to learn is generally not perfectly competitive. In particular, if endogenous welfare relevant learning is feasible, the economy cannot be perfectly competitive unless identical learning choices by all consumers are guaranteed. If the new information is not shared with everyone, asymmetric information arise; if information is shared, externalities arise. The standard conditions for the two fundamental welfare theorems, thus, implicitly preclude heterogeneous welfare relevant learning decisions.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Memorandum ; No. 02/2021
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Perfect Competition
General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: General
Welfare Economics: General
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Externalities
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Subject
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Perfect competition
fundamental welfare theorems
learning
symmetric information
externalities
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Nyborg, Karine
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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University of Oslo, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Oslo
- (when)
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2021
- Handle
- Last update
- 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Nyborg, Karine
- University of Oslo, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2021