Arbeitspapier

Screening and advising by a venture capitalist with a time constraint

This paper proposes an intertemporal model of venture capital investment with screening and advising where the venture capitalist's time endowment is the scarce input factor. Screening improves the selection of firms receiving finance, advising allows firms to develop a marketable product, both have a variable intensity. In our setup, optimal linear contracts solves the moral hazard problem. Screening however asks for an entrepreneur wage and does not allow for upfront payments which would cause severe adverse selection. Project characteristics have implications for screening and advising intensity and the distribution of profits. Finally, we develop a formal version of the 'venture capital cycle' by extending the basic setup to a simple model of venture capital supply and demand.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CFS Working Paper ; No. 2003/48

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: Other
Thema
Venture capital
market structure
product development
Risikokapital
Unternehmensgründung
Lieferanten-Kunden-Beziehung
Agency Theory
Betriebliche Terminplanung
Unternehmensberatung
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Dietz, Martin D.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2003

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-10528
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Dietz, Martin D.
  • Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)

Entstanden

  • 2003

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