Arbeitspapier

Optimal incentive regulation of multinational enterprises

Multinational enterprises (MNEs) have started to populate also regulated sectors. Their linked international activities and credible threats to relocate are then new concerns for regulators. We study a multiprincipal model in which a privately informed MNE (the agent) produces for two countries and is regulated by the two national authorities (the principals). We show that standard theory in the economics of regulation must be reconsidered in a world with MNEs and novel results arise. We study MNE's incentives to allocate resources to lobby the two non-benevolent regulators and we analyse optimal ownership patterns as a substitute for co-operation in regulation between countries.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 51.1999

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Economics of Regulation
Multinational Firms; International Business
Thema
Multinational enterprises
Regulation
Asymmetric information
Multiprincipal
Lobbying
Anreizregulierung
Multinationales Unternehmen
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Asymmetrische Information
Interessenpolitik
Spieltheorie
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Calzolari, Giacomo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
1999

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Calzolari, Giacomo
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 1999

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