Arbeitspapier
Optimal incentive regulation of multinational enterprises
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) have started to populate also regulated sectors. Their linked international activities and credible threats to relocate are then new concerns for regulators. We study a multiprincipal model in which a privately informed MNE (the agent) produces for two countries and is regulated by the two national authorities (the principals). We show that standard theory in the economics of regulation must be reconsidered in a world with MNEs and novel results arise. We study MNE's incentives to allocate resources to lobby the two non-benevolent regulators and we analyse optimal ownership patterns as a substitute for co-operation in regulation between countries.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 51.1999
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Economics of Regulation
Multinational Firms; International Business
- Subject
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Multinational enterprises
Regulation
Asymmetric information
Multiprincipal
Lobbying
Anreizregulierung
Multinationales Unternehmen
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Asymmetrische Information
Interessenpolitik
Spieltheorie
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Calzolari, Giacomo
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (where)
-
Milano
- (when)
-
1999
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Calzolari, Giacomo
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Time of origin
- 1999