Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games

Arbeitspapier

We prove the existence of strategically stable sets of pure-strategy Nash equilibria (and hence the existence of pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibria) in potential games that admit an upper semicontinuous potential, and we show that generic potential games possess pure-strategy strictly perfect and essential equilibria. In addition, we provide a link between upper semicontinuity of a potential and conditions defined directly on the payoff functions of a potential game. Finally, we show that stable sets and (strictly) perfect equilibria are related to the set of maximizers of a potential, which refines the set of Nash equilibria. Specifically, the set of maximizers of a potential contains a strategically stable set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria (and hence a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium) and, for generic games, any maximizer of a potential is a pure-strategy strictly perfect and essential equilibrium.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2011-25

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games
• Thema: discontinuous game ; potential game ; trembling-hand perfect equilibrium ; stable set ; essential equilibrium ; Kooperatives Spiel ; Nash-Gleichgewicht ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol ; McLean, Richard P.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Rutgers University, Department of Economics
• (wo): New Brunswick, NJ
• (wann): 2011

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59495
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ