Arbeitspapier

The (unintended?) consequences of the largest liquidity injection ever

We study the design of lender of last resort interventions and show that the provision of long-term liquidity incentivizes purchases of high-yield short-term securities by banks. Using a unique security-level data set, we find that the European Central Bank's three-year Long-Term Refinancing Operation incentivized Portuguese banks to purchase short-term domestic government bonds that could be pledged to obtain central bank liquidity. This "collateral trade" effect is large, as banks purchased short-term bonds equivalent to 8.4% of amount outstanding. The resumption of public debt issuance is consistent with a strategic reaction of the debt agency to the observed yield curve steepening.

ISBN
978-92-95081-66-6
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ESRB Working Paper Series ; No. 31

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Central Banks and Their Policies
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
National Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
Thema
Lender of Last Resort
Unconventional Monetary Policy
Sovereign Debt

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Crosignani, Matteo
Faria-e-Castro, Miguel
Fonseca, Luís
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), European System of Financial Supervision
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2016

DOI
doi:10.2849/63995
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Crosignani, Matteo
  • Faria-e-Castro, Miguel
  • Fonseca, Luís
  • European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), European System of Financial Supervision

Entstanden

  • 2016

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