Artikel

Voting and Power in the Small Firm: Alternatives to the One-Share, One-Vote Rule

The one-share, one-vote rule applicable to the governance of most business firms provides for proportional voting power which differs substantially from proportional shareholdings of investors. This problem is particularly acute in small firms where several (or many) shareholders may hold significant proportions of shares. This paper reviews well-known game theoretic algorithms (weighting or vote assignment schemes) for the alignment of power with proportional shareholdings. It also provides a simple measure of the “misalignment of power from proportional shareholdings” and discusses its application in determining more equitable vote reassignment schemes.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Journal of Small Business Finance ; ISSN: 1057-2287 ; Volume: 3 ; Year: 1994 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 127-139 ; Greenwich, CT: JAI Press

Klassifikation
Management
Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Thema
Voting
Governance
One-Share One-Vote
Cumulative Voting
Small Firm
Small Business

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Goon, Robert
Teall, John L.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
JAI Press
(wo)
Greenwich, CT
(wann)
1994

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2026, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Goon, Robert
  • Teall, John L.
  • JAI Press

Entstanden

  • 1994

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