Artikel
Voting and Power in the Small Firm: Alternatives to the One-Share, One-Vote Rule
The one-share, one-vote rule applicable to the governance of most business firms provides for proportional voting power which differs substantially from proportional shareholdings of investors. This problem is particularly acute in small firms where several (or many) shareholders may hold significant proportions of shares. This paper reviews well-known game theoretic algorithms (weighting or vote assignment schemes) for the alignment of power with proportional shareholdings. It also provides a simple measure of the “misalignment of power from proportional shareholdings” and discusses its application in determining more equitable vote reassignment schemes.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Journal of Small Business Finance ; ISSN: 1057-2287 ; Volume: 3 ; Year: 1994 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 127-139 ; Greenwich, CT: JAI Press
- Klassifikation
-
Management
Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- Thema
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Voting
Governance
One-Share One-Vote
Cumulative Voting
Small Firm
Small Business
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Goon, Robert
Teall, John L.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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JAI Press
- (wo)
-
Greenwich, CT
- (wann)
-
1994
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 10.03.2026, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft.
Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Goon, Robert
- Teall, John L.
- JAI Press
Entstanden
- 1994