Arbeitspapier

Regulatory competition and international cooperation

Recent research has shown that regulatory competition does not necessarily lead to downward pressures on regulation, but may at times also push the level of regulation upwards. Extending David Vogel's California effect argument, this paper shows that such upward pressure may not only result directly from the dynamics of the competitive process but also from international cooperation. Evidence from two case studies on international capital market regulation is used to identify the conditions under which cooperation in the shadow of regulatory competition is likely to succeed or fail. The successful multilateral standardisation of banking capital requirements in the BIS is compared to failed attempts to harmonise interest taxation across EC member states.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: MPIfG Working Paper ; No. 97/4

Klassifikation
Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie, Anthropologie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Genschel, Philipp
Plümper, Thomas
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
(wo)
Cologne
(wann)
1997

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Genschel, Philipp
  • Plümper, Thomas
  • Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies

Entstanden

  • 1997

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