Arbeitspapier

Creative Destruction and Productive Preemption

We develop a theory of commercialization mode (entry or sale) of entrepreneurial inventions into oligopoly, and show that an invention of higher quality is more likely to be sold (or licensed) to an incumbent due to strategic product market effects on the sales price. Moreover, preemptive acquisitions by incumbents are shown to stimulate the process of creative destruction by increasing the entrepreneurial effort allocated to high-quality invention projects. Using detailed data on patents granted to small firms and individuals, we find evidence that high-quality inventions are often sold, and that they are sold under bidding competition.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 799

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
New Firms; Startups
Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights: General
Thema
Acquisitions
Entrepreneurship
Innovation
Start-ups
Patent
Ownership
Quality
Innovation
Patent
Unternehmensgründung
Kommerzialisierung
Schumpeterismus
Übernahme
Probit-Modell
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Norbäck, Pehr-Johan
Persson, Lars
Svensson, Roger
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
(wo)
Stockholm
(wann)
2009

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Norbäck, Pehr-Johan
  • Persson, Lars
  • Svensson, Roger
  • Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Entstanden

  • 2009

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