Arbeitspapier
Equilibrium Paths in Discounted Supergames
This paper characterizes the subgame-perfect pure-strategy equilibrium paths in discounted supergames with perfect monitoring. It is shown that all the equilibrium paths are composed of fragments called elementary subpaths. This characterization result is complemented with an algorithm for finding the elementary subpaths. By using these subpaths it is possible to generate equilibrium paths and payoffs. When there are finitely many elementary subpaths, all the equilibrium paths can be represented by a directed graph. These graphs can be used in analyzing the complexity of equilibrium outcomes. In particular, it is shown that the size and the density of the equilibrium set can be measured by the asymptotic growth rate of equilibrium paths and the Hausdorff dimension of the payoff set.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Discussion paper ; No. 96
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- Subject
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repeated game
subgame-perfect equilibrium
equilibrium path
graph presentation of paths
complexity
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Berg, Kimmo
Kitti, Mitri
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
- (where)
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Turku
- (when)
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2014
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Berg, Kimmo
- Kitti, Mitri
- Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
Time of origin
- 2014