Arbeitspapier

Equilibrium Paths in Discounted Supergames

This paper characterizes the subgame-perfect pure-strategy equilibrium paths in discounted supergames with perfect monitoring. It is shown that all the equilibrium paths are composed of fragments called elementary subpaths. This characterization result is complemented with an algorithm for finding the elementary subpaths. By using these subpaths it is possible to generate equilibrium paths and payoffs. When there are finitely many elementary subpaths, all the equilibrium paths can be represented by a directed graph. These graphs can be used in analyzing the complexity of equilibrium outcomes. In particular, it is shown that the size and the density of the equilibrium set can be measured by the asymptotic growth rate of equilibrium paths and the Hausdorff dimension of the payoff set.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Discussion paper ; No. 96

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Subject
repeated game
subgame-perfect equilibrium
equilibrium path
graph presentation of paths
complexity

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Berg, Kimmo
Kitti, Mitri
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
(where)
Turku
(when)
2014

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Berg, Kimmo
  • Kitti, Mitri
  • Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)

Time of origin

  • 2014

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