Environmental regulation and technology transfers

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyzes the situation in which a national government introduces environmental regulations. Within the framework of an international duopoly with environmental regulations, this paper shows that an environmental tax imposed by the government in the home country can induce a foreign firm with advanced abatement technology to license it to a domestic firm without this technology. Furthermore, when the domestic firm's production technology is less efficient than that of the foreign firm, the foreign firm may freely reveal its technology to the domestic firm. These improvements through the voluntary transfer of technology support the Porter hypothesis, which states that environmental regulations have positive impacts on innovation.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 862

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth ; Trade and Environment ; Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Subject: Environmental regulation ; Technology transfer ; International competition ; Duopoly ; Internationale Umweltpolitik ; Technologietransfer ; Internationaler Wettbewerb ; Duopol ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Asano, Takao ; Matsushima, Noriaki
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
• (where): Osaka
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92773
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET