Arbeitspapier

Cash-flow business taxation revisited: Bankruptcy, risk aversion and asymmetric information

It is well-known that cash-flow business taxes with full loss-offset, and their present-value equivalents, are neutral with respect to firms' investment decisions when firms are riskneutral and there are no distortions. We study the effects of cash-flow business taxation when there is bankruptcy risk, when firms are risk-averse, and when financial intermediaries face asymmetric information problems in financing heterogeneous firms. Cash-flow taxes remain neutral under bankruptcy risk alone, but can distort the entry and investment decisions of firms under both risk-aversion and asymmetric information. We characterize the nature of such distortions and show that cash-flow taxes can increase social welfare in this context. An ACE tax is equivalent to a cash-flow tax but is easier to implement under asymmetric information.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 1372

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
Thema
cash-flow tax
risk-averse firms
asymmetric information

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Boadway, Robin W.
Sato, Motohiro
Tremblay, Jean-François
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Queen's University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Kingston (Ontario)
(wann)
2016

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Boadway, Robin W.
  • Sato, Motohiro
  • Tremblay, Jean-François
  • Queen's University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2016

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