Arbeitspapier
Give to Caesar What is Caesar's. Or, Give to Launhardt What We are Used to Think Bertrand's
We revisit the Cournot-Bertrand debate in the light of Cournot (1863), Edgeworth (1881, 1897) and Launhardt (1885), tracing back to Launhardt the origin of price competition in duopoly models. Then, we discuss the formalization of consumer utility function for differentiated products, first appearing in Launhardt (1885) and than in Bowley (1924). This allows us to point out that assuming that firms know the demand function(s) is equivalent to assuming that there is no role for the auctioneer, either in Cournout or in Walras.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 413
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lambertini, Luca
Mosca, Manuela
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (wo)
-
Bologna
- (wann)
-
2001
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4886
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lambertini, Luca
- Mosca, Manuela
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Entstanden
- 2001
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