Democracy Deficits, Inequality and Pollution. A Politico-Economic Analysis

Arbeitspapier

The article examines conditions, under which the degree of democratization influences environmental policy outcomes, with a given resource endowments' heterogeneity as a crucial feature of a politico-economic process. We develop an OLG model with pollution as an aggregate externality. The decisive voter chooses redistribution contributing to abatement financing. By comparing the optimal taxation under alternative political regimes we analyze their implications for environment, efficiency and growth. We find that left regimes, choosing more progressive redistribution, maintain better environmental quality, which supports empirical research. Inequality does not appear to be harmful for the environment, and it dampens the effect of democracy imperfections on redistribution.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Diskussionsbeitrag ; No. 323

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Environmental Economics: Government Policy ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions ; Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling ; Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
• Thema: Pollution ; Political Economy ; Inequality ; Redistribution ; Growth

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Drosdowski, Thomas
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
• (wo): Hannover
• (wann): 2005

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22435
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ