- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Dimensions
-
21 cm
- Extent
-
98 S.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Notes
-
graph. Darst.
Mannheim, Univ., Diss., 1998
- Keyword
-
Finanzierungstheorie
Asymmetrische Information
Kreditmarkt
Unvollkommene Information
Bank
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Theorie
Informationsökonomie
Mikroökonomisches Modell
Kreditmarkt
Informationsökonomie
Mikroökonomisches Modell
Finanzierungstheorie
Asymmetrische Information
Kreditmarkt
Unvollkommene Information
Bank
LEN-Modell
- Creator
-
Rheinbaben, Joachim von
- Table of contents
- Rights
-
Bei diesem Objekt liegt nur das Inhaltsverzeichnis digital vor. Der Zugriff darauf ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
11.03.2025, 12:28 PM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Hochschulschrift
Associated
- Rheinbaben, Joachim von
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