- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Maße
-
21 cm
- Umfang
-
98 S.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
graph. Darst.
Mannheim, Univ., Diss., 1998
- Schlagwort
-
Finanzierungstheorie
Asymmetrische Information
Kreditmarkt
Unvollkommene Information
Bank
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Theorie
Informationsökonomie
Mikroökonomisches Modell
Kreditmarkt
Informationsökonomie
Mikroökonomisches Modell
Finanzierungstheorie
Asymmetrische Information
Kreditmarkt
Unvollkommene Information
Bank
LEN-Modell
- Urheber
-
Rheinbaben, Joachim von
- Inhaltsverzeichnis
- Rechteinformation
-
Bei diesem Objekt liegt nur das Inhaltsverzeichnis digital vor. Der Zugriff darauf ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
11.06.2025, 13:55 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Hochschulschrift
Beteiligte
- Rheinbaben, Joachim von
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