Arbeitspapier
On Basu's proposal: Fines affect bribes
I model the connection between the equilibrium bribe amount and the fines imposed on both bribe-taker and bribe-payer. I show that Basu's (2011) proposal to lower the fines imposed on bribe-payers in order to induce more whistleblowing and increase the probability of penalizing corrupt government officials might instead increase bribe amounts. Higher expected fines on bribe-takers will make them charge larger bribes; at the same time, lowering fines for bribe-paying might increase bribe-payers' willingness to pay bribes.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; No. E2017/11
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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corruption
bribery
extortion
decentralization
fines
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Popov, Sergey V.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
- (where)
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Cardiff
- (when)
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2017
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Popov, Sergey V.
- Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
Time of origin
- 2017