Arbeitspapier

On Basu's proposal: Fines affect bribes

I model the connection between the equilibrium bribe amount and the fines imposed on both bribe-taker and bribe-payer. I show that Basu's (2011) proposal to lower the fines imposed on bribe-payers in order to induce more whistleblowing and increase the probability of penalizing corrupt government officials might instead increase bribe amounts. Higher expected fines on bribe-takers will make them charge larger bribes; at the same time, lowering fines for bribe-paying might increase bribe-payers' willingness to pay bribes.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; No. E2017/11

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
corruption
bribery
extortion
decentralization
fines

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Popov, Sergey V.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
(where)
Cardiff
(when)
2017

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Popov, Sergey V.
  • Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School

Time of origin

  • 2017

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