Artikel

CEO Marital Status and Insider Trading

We investigate the association between chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) marital status and their tendency to profit from insider trading. We argue that marriage can constrain CEOs’ opportunistic behaviour, which could increase litigation risk, and show that married CEOs earn lower insider trading returns compared to unmarried CEOs. Insider trades can be identified as either routine or opportunistic. We also find that married CEOs are less likely to engage in opportunistic trades, and they earn lower insider trading returns in firms with weaker corporate governance and higher information asymmetry. Our empirical results remain robust after accounting for several endogeneity tests.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: British Journal of Management ; ISSN: 1467-8551 ; Volume: 34 ; Year: 2022 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 1974-1991 ; Hoboken, NJ: Wiley

Classification
Management

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Hegde, Prasad
Liao, Shushu
Ma, Rui
Nguyen, Nhut H.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Wiley
(where)
Hoboken, NJ
(when)
2022

DOI
doi:10.1111/1467-8551.12673
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Hegde, Prasad
  • Liao, Shushu
  • Ma, Rui
  • Nguyen, Nhut H.
  • Wiley

Time of origin

  • 2022

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