Arbeitspapier
Criminals on the Field: A Study of College Football
Economists have found mixed evidence on what happens when the number of police increases. On the one hand, more law enforcers means higher probability of detecting a crime, which is known as monitoring effect. On the other hand, criminals incorporate this increase into their decision making process and thus may commit less crimes, constituting the deterrence effect. This study analyzes the effects of an increase in the number of on-field college football officials, taking players as potential criminals and officials as law enforcers. Analyzing a novel play by play dataset from two seasons of college football, we report evidence of a monitoring effect being present in the overall dataset. This effect is mainly driven by offensive penalties which are called in the area of jurisdiction of the added official. The decomposition of the effect provides a limited evidence for the presence of the deterrence effect in the case of penalties with severe punishment and committed by teams with moderately high ability.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: IES Working Paper ; No. 13/2017
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Project Evaluation; Social Discount Rate
Criminal Law
Sports Economics: Other
- Subject
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Football
Official
Crime
Deterrence
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Janhuba, Radek
Cechova, Kristyna
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Charles University in Prague, Institute of Economic Studies (IES)
- (where)
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Prague
- (when)
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2017
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Janhuba, Radek
- Cechova, Kristyna
- Charles University in Prague, Institute of Economic Studies (IES)
Time of origin
- 2017