Artikel

Strategic delegation in Nash bargaining

Bargainers can increase their outcome by delegation. This paper analyzes delegation contracts consisting of two components: First, a percentage of the outcome if the delegate concludes an agreement. Second, a bonus payment if the delegate fails to do so. This paper derives the effects of these components on the principal's payoff and shows that the optimal contract is unique. Optimally, the principal offers a small share and a high reward for failure to reach an agreement. Delegate's bargaining skills play no role in the optimal contract. The condition is derived under which the optimal contract benefits the principal.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Managerial and Decision Economics ; ISSN: 1099-1468 ; Volume: 45 ; Year: 2023 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 784-794 ; Hoboken, NJ: Wiley

Classification
Management

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Kirstein, Roland
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Wiley
(where)
Hoboken, NJ
(when)
2023

DOI
doi:10.1002/mde.4033
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Kirstein, Roland
  • Wiley

Time of origin

  • 2023

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