Artikel
Strategic delegation in Nash bargaining
Bargainers can increase their outcome by delegation. This paper analyzes delegation contracts consisting of two components: First, a percentage of the outcome if the delegate concludes an agreement. Second, a bonus payment if the delegate fails to do so. This paper derives the effects of these components on the principal's payoff and shows that the optimal contract is unique. Optimally, the principal offers a small share and a high reward for failure to reach an agreement. Delegate's bargaining skills play no role in the optimal contract. The condition is derived under which the optimal contract benefits the principal.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Managerial and Decision Economics ; ISSN: 1099-1468 ; Volume: 45 ; Year: 2023 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 784-794 ; Hoboken, NJ: Wiley
- Classification
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Management
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Kirstein, Roland
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Wiley
- (where)
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Hoboken, NJ
- (when)
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2023
- DOI
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doi:10.1002/mde.4033
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Kirstein, Roland
- Wiley
Time of origin
- 2023