Arbeitspapier

Does Group-Based Incentive Pay Lead To Higher Productivity? Evidence from a Complex and Interdependent Industrial Production Process

Group-based incentive pay is attractive in contexts where production is complex and interdependent, yet freeriding is a paramount concern. We assess the introduction of group-based performance pay in a modern industrial production setting using difference-in-difference estimation. Performance increased by 19 percent, with three quarters coming from increased performance of existing workers and the remaining from selection; workers became more efficient and were absent less often. We find little evidence of freeriding; quantile regressions show increased performance throughout the distribution of workers. Features of the design and implementation process created trust, a common goal, and a shared identity, which limited freeriding.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 14986

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Organization of Production
Thema
difference-in-differences
performance pay
group-based incentive
freeriding
incentive effects
selection effects
absenteeism
efficiency
performance
productivity
trust

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Frederiksen, Anders
Hansen, Daniel Baltzer Schjødt
Flaherty Manchester, Colleen
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2022

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Frederiksen, Anders
  • Hansen, Daniel Baltzer Schjødt
  • Flaherty Manchester, Colleen
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2022

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