Arbeitspapier
Experimental labor markets and policy considerations: Incomplete contracts and macroeconomic aspects
This survey focuses on experimental labor markets investigating two aspects that deem us important for a better understanding of labor market relations and the consequences for labor market policies. The first part of the survey is dedicated to papers that assess the prevalence of reciprocal considerations in incomplete labor contracts. The second part summarizes the relatively small but growing experimental literature exploring labor issues in a macroeconomics and public finance setting and studying the interaction between taxation and labor market outcomes.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 7102
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: General
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Field Experiments
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Exchange and Production Economies
Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
Fiscal Policy
Open Economy Macroeconomics
Labor Economics: General
Labor Economics Policies
- Thema
-
laboratory experiment
labor markets
incomplete contracts
gift-exchange
labor market policy
Arbeitsmarktpolitik
Beschäftigungseffekt
Arbeitsmarkt
Unvollkommener Markt
Arbeitsmarkttheorie
Test
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Casoria, Fortuna
Riedl, Arno
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Casoria, Fortuna
- Riedl, Arno
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2012
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