Arbeitspapier

International environmental negotiations: Does coalition size matter?

This paper reconsiders a widely used game of coalition formation in international environmental negotiations. Due to the mathematical problems of giving a full characterization of the solution, up to now most of the work on this subject rested on numerical simulations to derive results. In this paper we show for a general class of payoff functions that when the game is approximated by assuming a continuum of players, a solution can be found. Using this result as a "benchmark solution", we further show that gains from cooperation resulting in simulations are due to an "integer effect", i.e. coalition size being treated as a discrete variable.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 00/20

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Rutz, Samuel
Borek, Thomas
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
(where)
Zurich
(when)
2000

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Rutz, Samuel
  • Borek, Thomas
  • ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research

Time of origin

  • 2000

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