Cache-Timing Attack Against HQC

Abstract: In this paper, we present the first chosen-ciphertext (CC) cache-timing attacks on the reference implementation of HQC. We build a cache-timing based distinguisher for implementing a plaintext-checking (PC) oracle. The PC oracle uses side-channel information to check if a given ciphertext decrypts to a given message. This is done by identifying a vulnerability during the generating process of two vectors in the reference implementation of HQC. We also propose a new method of using PC oracles for chosen-ciphertext side-channel attacks against HQC, which may have independent interest. We show a general proof-of-concept attack, where we use the Flush+Reload technique and also derive, in more detail, a practical attack on an HQC execution on Intel SGX, where the Prime+Probe technique is used. We show the exact path to do key recovery by explaining the detailed steps, using the PC oracle. In both scenarios, the new attack requires 53, 857 traces on average with much fewer PC oracle call.... https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/10959

Location
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Extent
Online-Ressource
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Cache-Timing Attack Against HQC ; volume:2023 ; number:3 ; year:2023
IACR transactions on cryptographic hardware and embedded systems ; 2023, Heft 3 (2023)

Creator
Huang, Senyang
Sim, Rui Qi
Chuengsatiansup, Chitchanok
Guo, Qian
Johansson, Thomas

DOI
10.46586/tches.v2023.i3.136-163
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2023102519011982640273
Rights
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
Last update
14.08.2025, 11:01 AM CEST

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Associated

  • Huang, Senyang
  • Sim, Rui Qi
  • Chuengsatiansup, Chitchanok
  • Guo, Qian
  • Johansson, Thomas

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