Principals as agents? Investigating accountability in the compensation and performance of school principals
- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; No. 2662
- Schlagwort
-
Allgemeinbildende Schule
Führungskräfte
Leistungsorientierte Vergütung
Kompetenz
Bildungsniveau
Bildungsfinanzierung
USA
Allgemein bildende Schule
Führungskraft
Kompetenz
Kompetenz
Kompetenzdelegation
Bildungsniveau
Bildungsfinanzierung
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wer)
-
IZA
- (wann)
-
2007
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
-
Billger, Sherrilyn M.
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-20080415132
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
25.03.2025, 13:49 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Beteiligte
- Billger, Sherrilyn M.
- IZA
Entstanden
- 2007
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