Arbeitspapier

Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: a Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty

The relevance of bargaining to everyday life can easily be ascertained, yet the study of any bargaining process is extremely hard, involving a multiplicity of questions and complex issues. The objective of this paper is to provide new insights on some dimensions of the bargaining process – asymmetries and uncertainties in particular – by using a non-cooperative game theory approach. We develop a computational model which simulates the process of negotiation among more than two players, who bargain over the sharing of more than one pie. Through numerically simulating several multiple issues negotiation games among multiple players, we identify the main features of players’ optimal strategies and equilibrium agreements. As in most economic situations, uncertainty crucially affects also bargaining processes. Therefore, in our analysis, we introduce uncertainty over the size of the pies to be shared and assess the impacts on players’ strategic behaviour. Our results confirm that uncertainty crucially affects players’ behaviour and modifies the likelihood of a self-enforcing agreement to emerge. The model proposed here can have several applications, in particular in the field of natural resource management, where conflicts over how to share a resource of a finite size are increasing.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 81.2007

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Cooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Thema
Bargaining
Non-Cooperative Game Theory
Simulation Models
Uncertainty
Verhandlungstheorie
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Simulation
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Sgobbi, Alessandra
Carraro, Carlo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Sgobbi, Alessandra
  • Carraro, Carlo
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2007

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