Arbeitspapier

Sabotage in dynamic tournaments

This paper studies sabotage in a dynamic tournament. Three players compete in two rounds. In the final round, a player who is leading in the race, but not yet beyond the reach of his competitors, gets sabotaged more heavily. As a consequence, if players are at the same position initially, they do not work productively or sabotage at all in the first round. Thus sabotage is not only directly destructive, but also depresses incentives to work productively. If players are heterogeneous ex ante, sabotage activities in the first round may be concentrated against an underdog, contrary to findings from static tournaments. We also discuss the robustness of our results in a less stylized environment.

Alternative title
Sabotage in dynamischen Turnieren
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2009-06

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Dynamic tournaments
contests
sabotage
heterogeneity

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Gürtler, Oliver
Münster, Johannes
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
(where)
Berlin
(when)
2009

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Gürtler, Oliver
  • Münster, Johannes
  • Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)

Time of origin

  • 2009

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