Arbeitspapier
Sabotage in dynamic tournaments
This paper studies sabotage in a dynamic tournament. Three players compete in two rounds. In the final round, a player who is leading in the race, but not yet beyond the reach of his competitors, gets sabotaged more heavily. As a consequence, if players are at the same position initially, they do not work productively or sabotage at all in the first round. Thus sabotage is not only directly destructive, but also depresses incentives to work productively. If players are heterogeneous ex ante, sabotage activities in the first round may be concentrated against an underdog, contrary to findings from static tournaments. We also discuss the robustness of our results in a less stylized environment.
- Alternative title
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Sabotage in dynamischen Turnieren
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2009-06
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Dynamic tournaments
contests
sabotage
heterogeneity
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Gürtler, Oliver
Münster, Johannes
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- (where)
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Berlin
- (when)
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2009
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Gürtler, Oliver
- Münster, Johannes
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Time of origin
- 2009