Environmental Policy and Renewable Energy in an Imperfectly Competitive Market

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyses an electricity market in which a monopolist that employs fossil-fuel base-load and peak-load technologies competes against a fringe of renewable energy (RE) generators. The optimal technology and electricity mix can be decentralised by levying technology-dependent capacity taxes/subsidies in addition to technology-/state-dependent emission taxes. Whenever base-load capacity is taxed (subsidised), peak-load capacity is subsidised (taxed). A decline in RE capacity costs and an increase in the share of consumers on real-time prices predominantly raises emission taxes and brings them closer to their Pigouvian level, albeit with some qualifications. Capacity taxes/subsidies disappear when all consumers are on real-time prices and RE is about to fully crowd out conventional base-load capacity.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 10524

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Alternative Energy Sources ; Energy: Government Policy ; Environmental Economics: Government Policy ; Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Thema: intermittent renewable energy ; peak-load technology ; base-load technology ; emission tax ; capacity tax/subsidy

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Haupt, Alexander
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2023

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/279274
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ