Monografie
Transitional Justice as a Post-Revolution Constitutional Arrangement: A Law and Economics Approach
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Identifier
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126567051X
- Thema
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Transitional justice; Law and economics; Tunesien
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
-
Muhammad Rashwan, Eman
Voigt, Stefan
- URN
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
16.09.2022, 08:56 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Monografie
Beteiligte
- Muhammad Rashwan, Eman
- Voigt, Stefan
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