Arbeitspapier

Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptility

This paper reports on an experiment of corruption that was conducted in two treatments: one with the possibility of detection and one without. It turns out that monitoring reduces corruption through deterrence; at the same time, it destroys the intrinsic motivation for honesty. Thus the net effect on overall corruption is a priori undetermined. We show that the salary level has an influence on corruption through increased opportunity costs of corruption, but fail to find evidence for a loyalty effect. Interesting policy conclusions emerge.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Diskussionsbeiträge - Serie I ; No. 303

Classification
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Subject
corruption
gender
intrinsic motivation
reciprocity

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Schulze, Günther G.
Frank, Björn
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Universität Konstanz, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften
(where)
Konstanz
(when)
2000

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Schulze, Günther G.
  • Frank, Björn
  • Universität Konstanz, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Time of origin

  • 2000

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