Arbeitspapier
Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptility
This paper reports on an experiment of corruption that was conducted in two treatments: one with the possibility of detection and one without. It turns out that monitoring reduces corruption through deterrence; at the same time, it destroys the intrinsic motivation for honesty. Thus the net effect on overall corruption is a priori undetermined. We show that the salary level has an influence on corruption through increased opportunity costs of corruption, but fail to find evidence for a loyalty effect. Interesting policy conclusions emerge.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Diskussionsbeiträge - Serie I ; No. 303
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Subject
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corruption
gender
intrinsic motivation
reciprocity
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Schulze, Günther G.
Frank, Björn
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Universität Konstanz, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften
- (where)
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Konstanz
- (when)
-
2000
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Schulze, Günther G.
- Frank, Björn
- Universität Konstanz, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Time of origin
- 2000