Improving Public Good Supply and Income Equality: Facing a Trade-Off

Arbeitspapier

It is explored in this paper how – depending on the agents’ preferences – an unequal income distribution may lead to a higher public good supply in a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium than in a cooperative Lindahl equilibrium that arises from a balanced income distribution. The degree of inequality that is needed for producing this result may be moderate what in particular is shown through an example with CES preferences.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8786

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions ; Public Goods ; Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
• Subject: public good ; Nash equilibrium ; Lindahl equilibrium ; income distribution

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Buchholz, Wolfgang ; Rübbelke, Dirk
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2020

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/229604
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET