Arbeitspapier

Salience of Law Enforcement: A Field Experiment

We conduct a field experiment to examine whether the deterrent effect of law enforcement depends on the salience of law enforcement activity. Our focus is on illegal disposal of household garbage in residential areas. At a random subset of 56 locations in a mid-sized city, law enforcement officers supplemented their regular enforcement activities by the practice of putting brightly-colored warning labels on illegally disposed garbage bags. This treatment made the existing enforcement activities suddenly much more apparent to residents. We find evidence for a substantial reduction in illegal disposal of garbage in response to the treatment.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 11644

Classification
Wirtschaft
Field Experiments
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Subject
law enforcement
deterrence
perception
salience
disorder

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Dur, Robert
Vollaard, Ben
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2018

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Dur, Robert
  • Vollaard, Ben
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2018

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