Arbeitspapier

The provision of public goods with positive group interdependencies

This article examines the nature of human behavior in a nested social dilemma referred to as the Spillover Game. Players are divided into two groups with positive production interdependencies. Based on theoretically derived opportunistic, local, and global optima, our experimental results demonstrate the importance of in-group beneficiaries over global efficiency. We find that the observed behavior is primarily determined by an imperfect conditional cooperation that prioritizes local level feedback. Results stress the importance of building strong local level commitment to encourage the provision of public goods with positive externalities.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2010,022

Classification
Wirtschaft
Public Goods
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Subject
Public good
experiment
groups
Spillover Game
social dilemma
Öffentliches Gut
Gefangenendilemma
Soziale Beziehungen
Spillover-Effekt
Test

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Güth, Werner
Sääksvuori, Lauri
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
(where)
Jena
(when)
2010

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Güth, Werner
  • Sääksvuori, Lauri
  • Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2010

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