Konferenzbeitrag

Collusive effects of a monopolist's use of an intermediary to deliver to retailers

A manufacturer contracting secretly with several downstream competitors faces an opportunism problem, preventing it from exerting its market power. In an infinitely repeated game, the opportunism problem can be relaxed. We show that the upstream firm's market power can be restored even further if the upstream firm chooses a mixed distribution system in which it makes use of an intermediary to distribute the good to a subset of the retailers and delivers directly only to the remaining downstream firms.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Industrial Organization I ; No. A11-V1

Classification
Wirtschaft
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Teichmann, Isabel
von Schlippenbach, Vanessa
Event
Veröffentlichung
(when)
2015

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Konferenzbeitrag

Associated

  • Teichmann, Isabel
  • von Schlippenbach, Vanessa

Time of origin

  • 2015

Other Objects (12)