Konferenzbeitrag
Collusive effects of a monopolist's use of an intermediary to deliver to retailers
A manufacturer contracting secretly with several downstream competitors faces an opportunism problem, preventing it from exerting its market power. In an infinitely repeated game, the opportunism problem can be relaxed. We show that the upstream firm's market power can be restored even further if the upstream firm chooses a mixed distribution system in which it makes use of an intermediary to distribute the good to a subset of the retailers and delivers directly only to the remaining downstream firms.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Industrial Organization I ; No. A11-V1
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Teichmann, Isabel
von Schlippenbach, Vanessa
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (when)
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2015
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Konferenzbeitrag
Associated
- Teichmann, Isabel
- von Schlippenbach, Vanessa
Time of origin
- 2015