Arbeitspapier
Settlements and appeals in the European Commission's cartel cases: An empirical assessment
The introduction of the European Union (EU) Settlement Procedure in 2008 aimed at promoting the procedural efficiency of cartel investigations by the European Commission (EC). We use a data set consisting of 579 firms groups convicted by the EC for cartelization from 2000 to 2015 to investigate the impact of the settlement procedure on the probability to file an appeal. Based on the estimation of a model of the firm's decision to appeal in the presettlement era, we subsequently run out-of-sample predictions to estimate the number of hypothetical appeals cases in the settlement era absent the settlement procedure. Our findings of a settlement-induced reduction in the number of appeals of up to 55 percent allow the conclusion that the introduction of the settlement procedure generated substantial additional benefits to society beyond its undisputed key contribution of a faster and more efficient handling of cartel investigations by the EC.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 16-010
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Antitrust Law
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- Thema
-
antitrust policy
cartels
settlements
appeals
ex-post evaluation
European Union
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hellwig, Michael
Hüschelrath, Kai
Laitenberger, Ulrich
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
- (wo)
-
Mannheim
- (wann)
-
2016
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-406522
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hellwig, Michael
- Hüschelrath, Kai
- Laitenberger, Ulrich
- Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
Entstanden
- 2016
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Settlements and appeals in the European Commission's cartel cases : an empirical assessment
Cartel Leniency and Settlements: A Joint Perspective
The appeals process: An empirical assessment
The appeals process : an empirical assessment
Cartel enforcement in the EU: Leniency programmes and the appeals process
Cartel enforcement in the EU : leniency programmes and the appeals process
Privy Council Appeals.
Plakatserie "Hiroshima Appeals"
Cartel destabilization and leniency programs: Empirical evidence
Cartel destabilization and leniency programs : empirical evidence
United Nations appeals tribunal
Report of Committee on Appeals
Settlements and appeals in the European Commission's cartel cases : an empirical assessment
Cartel Leniency and Settlements: A Joint Perspective
The appeals process: An empirical assessment
The appeals process : an empirical assessment
Cartel enforcement in the EU: Leniency programmes and the appeals process
Cartel enforcement in the EU : leniency programmes and the appeals process
Privy Council Appeals.
Plakatserie "Hiroshima Appeals"
Cartel destabilization and leniency programs: Empirical evidence
Cartel destabilization and leniency programs : empirical evidence
United Nations appeals tribunal
Report of Committee on Appeals
Settlements and appeals in the European Commission's cartel cases : an empirical assessment
Cartel Leniency and Settlements: A Joint Perspective
The appeals process: An empirical assessment
The appeals process : an empirical assessment
Cartel enforcement in the EU: Leniency programmes and the appeals process
Cartel enforcement in the EU : leniency programmes and the appeals process
Privy Council Appeals.
Plakatserie "Hiroshima Appeals"
Cartel destabilization and leniency programs: Empirical evidence
Cartel destabilization and leniency programs : empirical evidence
United Nations appeals tribunal