Arbeitspapier

The Effects Of Fiscal And Monetary Discipline On Budgetary Outcomes

This paper extends the game-theoretic model of Von Hagen and Harden (1995) that analyzes the impact of fiscal discipline on budgetary outcomes.It analyzes the effects on budgetary outcomes of both fiscal and monetary discipline, which are evaluated with respect to the relevant institutional rules. The model predicts that while both inflation and budget deficits are negatively associated with fiscal discipline, they may be positively associated with monetary discipline, proxied by central bank independence. This result obtains due to optimizing agents who internalize the burden of spending: inflation. Although not conclusive due to data limitations, the empirical findings of the paper support these predictions.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 2003/1

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Central Banks and Their Policies
National Budget; Budget Systems
State and Local Budget and Expenditures
Thema
Budget Deficits
Central Bank Independence
Fiscal Discipline
Inflation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Neyapti, Bilin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Turkish Economic Association
(wo)
Ankara
(wann)
2003

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Neyapti, Bilin
  • Turkish Economic Association

Entstanden

  • 2003

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