Arbeitspapier
Participation incentives and the design of voluntary agreements: Special issue on voluntary approaches, competition and competitiveness
This paper analyses the conditions under which a group of firms has the incentive to sign a Voluntary Agreement (VA) in order to control its emission flows even in the presence of free-riding by other firms in the industry. For the purpose of this paper it is assumed that free-riders cannot be completely excluded from the expected benefits of the VA, which increase with the number of signatory firms and with the abatement level achieved. The paper focuses on policy design by discussing the features that a VA should possess in order to increase its economic and environmental effectiveness. The results support some important conclusions. First, VAs cannot emerge in the case of a pure public good, i.e. when spillovers are such that all firms benefit from the abatement of the signatory firms. Second, even in the case of partial spillovers, the regulator has to impose a minimum participation constraint for the VA to be signed. In this case, if the minimum participation constraint is met, all firms have an incentive to sign the VA. Third, a VA with a minimum amount of regulation improves welfare with respect to a VA in which firms are free to set their profit maximising abatement level.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 19.2001
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
Firm Behavior: Theory
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy
- Subject
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Voluntary agreement
voluntary approach
environmental protection
free-riding
emissions tax
Selbstverpflichtung
Umweltbelastung
Trittbrettfahrerverhalten
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Spillover-Effekt
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Brau, Rinaldo
Carraro, Carlo
Golfetto, Giulio
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (where)
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Milano
- (when)
-
2001
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Brau, Rinaldo
- Carraro, Carlo
- Golfetto, Giulio
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Time of origin
- 2001
Other Objects (12)
Voluntary agreements and competition law
Voluntary agreements with industry
Self-enforcing voluntary agreements and environmental reputation
Voluntary agreements with industries: Participation incentives with industry-wide targets
Environmental regulation through voluntary agreements
Non-Verifiable Emissions, Voluntary Agreements, and Emission Taxes
Self-regulation, taxation and public voluntary environmental agreements
Voluntary Agreements under Endogenous Legislative Threats
The impact of voluntary environmental agreements on firms' incentives for technology adoption
Voluntary Agreements and the Environmental Efficiency of Participating Farms
Voluntary Agreements and the Environmental Efficiency of Participating Farms
Voluntary agreements as a substitute for regulations and economic instruments: Lessons from the German voluntary agreements on CO 2-reduction
Voluntary agreements and competition law
Voluntary agreements with industry
Self-enforcing voluntary agreements and environmental reputation
Voluntary agreements with industries: Participation incentives with industry-wide targets
Environmental regulation through voluntary agreements
Non-Verifiable Emissions, Voluntary Agreements, and Emission Taxes
Self-regulation, taxation and public voluntary environmental agreements
Voluntary Agreements under Endogenous Legislative Threats
The impact of voluntary environmental agreements on firms' incentives for technology adoption
Voluntary Agreements and the Environmental Efficiency of Participating Farms
Voluntary Agreements and the Environmental Efficiency of Participating Farms
Voluntary agreements as a substitute for regulations and economic instruments: Lessons from the German voluntary agreements on CO 2-reduction
Voluntary agreements and competition law
Voluntary agreements with industry
Self-enforcing voluntary agreements and environmental reputation
Voluntary agreements with industries: Participation incentives with industry-wide targets
Environmental regulation through voluntary agreements
Non-Verifiable Emissions, Voluntary Agreements, and Emission Taxes
Self-regulation, taxation and public voluntary environmental agreements
Voluntary Agreements under Endogenous Legislative Threats
The impact of voluntary environmental agreements on firms' incentives for technology adoption
Voluntary Agreements and the Environmental Efficiency of Participating Farms
Voluntary Agreements and the Environmental Efficiency of Participating Farms