Arbeitspapier
Determinants of self-reporting under the European corporate leniency program
We empirically investigate the determinants of self-reporting under the European corporate leniency program. Applying a data set consisting of 442 firm groups that participated in 76 cartels decided by the European Commission between 2000 and 2011, we find that the probability of a firm becoming the chief witness increases with its character as repeat offender, the size of the expected basic fine, the number of countries active in one group as well as the size of the firm's share in the cartelized market. Our results have important implications for an effective prosecution of anti-cartel law infringers.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 14-043
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Antitrust Law
- Subject
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Competition policy
cartels
leniency
European Union
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Hoang, Cung Truong
Hüschelrath, Kai
Laitenberger, Ulrich
Smuda, Florian
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
- (where)
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Mannheim
- (when)
-
2014
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-369191
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Hoang, Cung Truong
- Hüschelrath, Kai
- Laitenberger, Ulrich
- Smuda, Florian
- Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
Time of origin
- 2014