Arbeitspapier

Determinants of self-reporting under the European corporate leniency program

We empirically investigate the determinants of self-reporting under the European corporate leniency program. Applying a data set consisting of 442 firm groups that participated in 76 cartels decided by the European Commission between 2000 and 2011, we find that the probability of a firm becoming the chief witness increases with its character as repeat offender, the size of the expected basic fine, the number of countries active in one group as well as the size of the firm's share in the cartelized market. Our results have important implications for an effective prosecution of anti-cartel law infringers.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 14-043

Classification
Wirtschaft
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Antitrust Law
Subject
Competition policy
cartels
leniency
European Union

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Hoang, Cung Truong
Hüschelrath, Kai
Laitenberger, Ulrich
Smuda, Florian
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
(where)
Mannheim
(when)
2014

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-369191
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Hoang, Cung Truong
  • Hüschelrath, Kai
  • Laitenberger, Ulrich
  • Smuda, Florian
  • Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)

Time of origin

  • 2014

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