Arbeitspapier

Why forcing people to save for retirement may backfire

If individuals are unable or unwilling to borrow, a higher than desired second pillar pension capital may induce people to retire earlier than they would have in the absence of such a scheme. Individuals thus leave the workforce as soon as the retirement income is deemed sufficient and the pension plan avails withdrawal of benefits. We provide evidence using individual data from a selection of Swiss pension funds, allowing us to perfectly control for pension scheme details. Our findings suggest that affordability is a key determinant in the retirement decisions. The higher the accumulated pension capital, the earlier individuals tend to leave the workforce.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1458

Classification
Wirtschaft
Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Household
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
Retirement; Retirement Policies
Subject
occupational pension
retirement decision
duration models
Altersgrenze
Alterssicherung
Sparen
Pensionsfonds
Arbeitsangebot
Schätzung
Schweiz

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Buetler, Monika
Huguenin, Olivia
Teppa, Federica
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2005

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Buetler, Monika
  • Huguenin, Olivia
  • Teppa, Federica
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2005

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