Arbeitspapier

Voluntary disclosure schemes for offshore tax evasion

Tax authorities worldwide are implementing voluntary disclosure schemes to recover tax on offshore investments. Such schemes are typically designed retrospectively following the bulk acquisition of information on offshore holdings, such as the recent "Paradise" and "Panama" papers. They offer an opportunity for affected taxpayers to make a voluntary disclosure, with reduced fine rates for truthful disclosure. We characterize the taxpayer/tax authority game with and without a scheme and show that a scheme increases net expected tax revenue, decreases illegal offshore investment, increases onshore investment, and could either increase or decrease total offshore investment (legal plus illegal).

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IFS Working Papers ; No. W18/07

Classification
Wirtschaft
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Subject
voluntary disclosure
offshore tax evasion
tax amnesty
third-party information

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Gould, Matthew
Rablen, Matthew D.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)
(where)
London
(when)
2018

DOI
doi:10.1920/wp.ifs.2018.W1807
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Gould, Matthew
  • Rablen, Matthew D.
  • Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)

Time of origin

  • 2018

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