All-pay auctions with handicaps

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyzes an all-pay auction where the winner is determined according to the sum of the bid and a handicap endowed to all players. The bidding strategy in equilibrium is then explicitly derived as a 'piecewise affine transformation' of the equilibrium strategy in an all-pay auction without handicaps. The paper also discusses the allocation rule implemented in the equilibrium and provides a comparison of revenue.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 781

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Auctions ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Economics of Contract: Theory
• Subject: asymmetric auctions ; all-pay auctions ; handicap auctions ; Asymmetrische Information ; Auktionstheorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kitahara, Minoru ; Ogawa, Ryo
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
• (where): Osaka
• (when): 2010

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92645
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET