Arbeitspapier

Preemption, start-up decisions and the firms' capital structure

In this article, we analyse the interactions between financial and start-up decisions in an oligopolistic framework, where firms compete to enter a new market. We show that preemption can substantially reduce the negative effects of credit rationing on start-up investment decisions.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2006

Classification
Wirtschaft
Bankruptcy; Liquidation
Subject
Oligopol
Unternehmensgründung
Sunk Costs
Potenzieller Wettbewerb
Kapitalstruktur
Realoption
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Moretto, Michele
Panteghini, Paolo M.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2007

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Moretto, Michele
  • Panteghini, Paolo M.
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2007

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