Attentional Structure and Phenomenal Unity

Abstract: Some authors argue that phenomenal unity can be grounded in the attentional structure of consciousness, which endows conscious states with at least a foreground and a background. Accordingly, the phenomenal character of part of a conscious state comprises a content aspect (e.g., hearing music) and a structural aspect (e.g., being in the background). This view presents the concern that such a structure does not bring about phenomenal unity, but phenomenal segregation, since the background is separated from the foreground. I argue that attention can still lead to a form of phenomenal unity that connects the foreground with the background. Experiencing oneself as controlling the focus of attention can, at least occasionally, bring about an experienced connection between the attentional foreground and the attentional background of a conscious experience.

Object Details

• Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Extent: Online-Ressource
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Attentional Structure and Phenomenal Unity ; volume:5 ; number:1 ; year:2022 ; pages:254-264 ; extent:11 ; Open Philosophy ; 5, Heft 1 (2022), 254-264 (gesamt 11)

Contributors, Places and Time

• Creator: Wiese, Wanja

Further information

• DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2022-0197
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2022080214405274780337
• Rights: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Last update: 15.08.2025, 7:32 AM CEST