Distributive Justice in the Lab: Testing the Binding Role of Agreement

Abstract: Lorenzo Sacconi and his coauthors have put forward the hypothesis that impartial agreements on distributive rules may generate a conditional preference for conformity. The observable effect of this preference would be compliance with fair distributive rules chosen behind a veil of ignorance, even in the absence of external coercion. This paper uses a Dictator Game with production and taking option to compare two ways in which the device of the veil of ignorance may be thought to generate a motivation for, and compliance with a fair distributive rule: individually-as a thought experiment that should work as a moral cue- and collectively-as an actual process of agreement among subjects. The main result is that actual agreement proves to be necessary for agents to be led towards a fair distributive principle and to generate a significant amount of compliance in absence of external authority. This conclusion vindicates the role of actual agreements in generating motivational power in correspondence with fair distributive rules.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Standort: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Umfang: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Distributive Justice in the Lab: Testing the Binding Role of Agreement ; volume:42 ; number:1 ; year:2020 ; pages:107-136 ; extent:30 ; Analyse & Kritik ; 42, Heft 1 (2020), 107-136 (gesamt 30)

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Urheber: Faillo, Marco ; Marcon, Laura ; Francés-Gómez, Pedro

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: 10.1515/auk-2020-0005
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2023120713153904665697
• Rechteinformation: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 15.08.2025, 07:21 MESZ