Arbeitspapier

On existence of private unemployment insurance with advance information on future job losses

We study the existence of a profitable unemployment insurance market in a dynamic economy with adverse selection rooting in information on future job losses. The new feature of the model is that the insurer and workers interact repeatedly. Repeated interactions make it possible to threaten workers with exclusion from future insurance benefits after a default on insurance premia. With exclusion, not only the insurance against the fundamental risk, but also against future bad news about job losses matters. In contrast to conventional wisdom, we find that private unemployment insurance in the US can be profitable for a relatively short exclusion length of one year. To stimulate the emergence of a private unemployment insurance market, policy makers can facilitate the creation of a registry that archives past defaults on insurance premia.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. TI 2021-052/VI

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Thema
Advance information
subjective expectations
adverse selection
unemployment insurance
repeated interactions
dynamic contracts

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Denderski, Piotr
Stoltenberg, Christian A.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2021

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Denderski, Piotr
  • Stoltenberg, Christian A.
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2021

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