Arbeitspapier

It Hurts to Ask

We analyze the offering, asking, and granting of help or other benefits as a three-stage game with bilateral private information between a person in need of help and a potential help-giver. Asking entails the risk of rejection, which can be painful: since unawareness of the need can no longer be an excuse, a refusal reveals that the person in need, or the relationship, is not valued very much. We show that a failure to ask can occur even when most helpers would help if told about the need, and that even though a greater need makes help both more valuable and more likely to be granted, it can reduce the propensity to ask. When potential helpers concerned about the recipient's ask-shyness can make spontaneous offers, this can be a double-edged sword: offering reveals a more caring type and helps solve the failure-to-ask problem, but not offering reveals a not-socaring one, and this itself deters asking. This discouragement effect can also generate a trap where those in need hope for an offer while willing helpers hope for an ask, resulting in significant inefficiencies.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 15576

Classification
Wirtschaft
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
Subject
helping
asking
rejection
respect
shyness
altruism
cooperation
prosocial
image
reputation
information aversion

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Benabou, Roland
Jaroszewicz, Ania
Loewenstein, George
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2022

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Benabou, Roland
  • Jaroszewicz, Ania
  • Loewenstein, George
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2022

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